Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

*Working Together To Interdict WMD-related Transfers*

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1. Overview
What is the PSI?

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is “a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.” (Statement of Interdiction Principles)

PSI is an informal and voluntary network that brings together states committed to preventing and stopping illicit transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

PSI is not an international coalition against specific states.
Background

- **September 11 Attacks (2001)**

- **So San Incident (2002)**
  
  North Korean ship So San was found carrying Scud missiles, warheads, and rocket propellant to Yemen, but was allowed to continue its navigation.

**PSI was launched in 2003 to:**

- Fill the gap in international counter-proliferation frameworks
- Strengthen the national and collective capacities of participating states to interdict WMD-related transfers of concern at sea, in the air, or on land, once they have left their state of origin.
Statement of Interdiction Principles

“PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.”
Statement of Interdiction Principles

- Undertake effective measures, **either alone or in concert with other states**, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

- Adopt streamlined procedures for **rapid exchange of relevant information** concerning suspected proliferation activity...

- Review and work to **strengthen their relevant national legal authorities**... and work to **strengthen relevant international law and frameworks** in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
Statement of Interdiction Principles

➢ **Take specific actions** in support of interdiction efforts..., to include:

1. **Board and search any vessel flying their flag** in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, ...and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

2. **To seriously consider providing consent**... to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes...

3. **Stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas**, ...vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

4. **To require aircraft** that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes... and that are transiting their airspace **to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified**; and/or **deny aircraft** reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes **transit rights through their airspace**...

5. **If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transhipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport** reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and **to seize such cargoes** that are identified.
Effective interdiction requires a coordinated approach

- Diplomacy
- Customs & Law Enforcement
- Intelligence
- Other Relevant Ministries (Defense, Economy, etc.)
Endorsing States

- Established with 11 states in 2003
- 105 endorsing states as of 2019
2. PSI Activities
**PSI Activities**

- **High Level Political Meeting (all PSI-endorsing states)**
  Reviews progress and discusses future prospects

- **Operational Experts Group (OEG) (21 states)**
  Meets annually to ensure PSI’s effectiveness

- **Multilateral exercises**
  Aims to enhance counter-proliferation capabilities and cooperation
  **Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER)**
  
  *Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore and the United States rotate the hosting of annual regional PSI exercises.*

- **Workshops, outreach programs, etc.**
Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP)

- A collection of tools and resources to assist states to strengthen PSI-related capabilities and practices

- Four Elements:
  1. Prohibiting Proliferation-related Conduct
  2. Inspection and Identification
  3. Seizure and Disposition
  4. Rapid Decision Making
Relevant International Law and Frameworks

- UN Security Council Resolution 1540
- 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention
  (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation)
- Beijing Convention
  (Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation)
- Bilateral PSI Ship Boarding Agreements
3. Japan’s Efforts
Japan’s Efforts

As one of 11 original PSI members, Japan has:

- Hosted **four multilateral exercises**
  - Maritime Interdiction Exercises
    - Team Samurai 2004
    - Pacific Shield 2007
    - Pacific Shield 2018
  - Air Interdiction Exercise
    - Pacific Shield 2012
- Hosted an **OEG meeting** in 2010
- Conducted **outreach** with focus on Asia Senior-level Talks On non-Proliferation (ASTOP)
Maritime Interdiction Exercise - Pacific Shield 2018

- July 24-26, 2018 in Yokosuka, Japan
- The fifth iteration of the **Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER)** with **700 officials in foreign affairs, maritime security, border control, law enforcement, defense, counter-proliferation and export control** from 25 states
- 6 participating states:
  - Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, United States
- 19 observer states:
  - [PSI-endorsing states] Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia
  - [Non PSI-endorsing states] India, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan
Pacific Shield 2018

- **Academic Session**
  Presentations on PSI and non-proliferation

- **Table Top Exercise**
  Examination of national decision-making and multilateral cooperation

- **Live Exercise**
  Search, detection, pursuit and boarding on a suspect ship at sea

- **Port Exercise**
  Boarding inspection of a suspect ship and cargo at the port
Conclusion

- 15 years after the launch of the PSI, the threat of WMD proliferation still exists in the world. PSI-endorsing states are expected to strengthen their capabilities to prevent and interdict WMD-related transfers.

- The PSI and export control complement each other as counter-proliferation efforts. By enhancing mutual understanding and coordination between those efforts, we can better address global proliferation challenges together.